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ARTICLES
The Climate for Human Rights
REBECCA M. BRATSPIES*
Climate change is the defining challenge of the 21st century. The United States government is currently ignoring the
problem, but wishful thinking alone will not keep global
mean temperature rise below 2ºC. This Article proposes a
way forward. It advises environmental decision-makers to
use human rights norms to guide them as they make decisions under United States law. By reframing their discretion
through a human rights lens, decision-makers can use their
existing authority to respond to the super-wicked problem of
climate change.
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INTRODUCTION

“[N]o matter how well-informed you are, you are surely not
alarmed enough.”1
Human impacts on the globe have become so omnipresent that
the term “Anthropocene” is no longer an esoteric debate among scientists.2 The proposition that we have entered a new geologic era—
one dominated by human activities, rather than geological forces—
has become conventional wisdom.3 The many unsustainable practices4 that make up the Anthropocene threaten our ability to “preserve a planet similar to that on which civilization developed and to
which life on earth is adapted.”5 Nowhere is the Anthropocene more

1

David Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth, N.Y. MAG. (July 9, 2017,
9:00 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/07/climate-change-earthtoo-hot-for-humans.html.
2
See Jan Zalasiewicz et al., The New World of the Anthropocene, 44 ENVTL.
SCI. TECH. 2228, 2228 (2010); Paul J. Crutzen, Geology of Mankind,
415 NATURE 23, 23 (2002).
3
Zalasiewicz et al., supra note 2, at 2228.
4
E.g., Elizabeth Kolbert, Enter the Anthropocene—Age of Man, NAT’L GEO.
(Mar. 2011), http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2011/03/age-of-man/kolberttext. We are in the midst of the 6th mass extinction. Damian Carrington, Earth’s
Sixth Mass Extinction Event Under Way, Scientists Warn, GUARDIAN (July 10,
2017, 3:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jul/10/earthssixth-mass-extinction-event-already-underway-scientists-warn. Toxic chemicals
are accumulating throughout the global environment. See generally FRANCIS O.
ADEOLA, INDUSTRIAL DISASTERS, TOXIC WASTE, AND COMMUNITY
IMPACT: HEALTH EFFECTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE STRUGGLES AROUND
THE GLOBE (2012); Kristen S. Schafer & Susan E. Kegley, Persistent Toxic Chemicals in the US Food Supply, 56 J. EPIDEMIOL COMMUNITY HEALTH 813, 813–15
(2002); Yukie Mato et al., Plastic Resin Pellets as a Transport Medium for Toxic
Chemicals in the Marine Environment, 35 ENVTL. SCI. TECH. 318, 318 (2001). At
the same time, human global population is rising exponentially. Dep’t of Economic and Social Affairs: Population Division, World Population Prospects: Key
Findings and Advance Tables, at 1 tbl.1, U.N. Doc. ESA/P/WP/248 (2017),
https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf.
5
James Hansen et al., Target Atmospheric CO2: Where Should Humanity
Aim?, 2 OPEN ATMOSPHERIC SCI. J. 217, 217 (2008).
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visible than when considering the rapid pace of human-induced climate change.6 In September 2016, the Scripps Institute announced
that global atmospheric carbon dioxide levels crossed the 400 ppm
line permanently (or at least for “the indefinite future”).7 Indeed, we
have known for nearly two decades that “it is not a question of
whether the Earth’s climate will change, but rather when, where, and
by how much.”8
Life in a 400 ppm world will be very different from how humans
have experienced the Earth throughout our 200,000 year history.9
We are already seeing glimmers of what that new world will be like.
During a recent heatwave, Arizona residents took to social media
with photos of eggs, cookies, and meat cooking in the sun;10 and

6
See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT 5 (Rajendra K. Pachauri et al. eds., 2015)
[hereinafter IPCC].
7
Rob Monroe, Notes on Reaching the Annual Low Point, SCRIPPS
INSTITUTION OF OCEANOGRAPHY: THE KEELING CURVE (Sept. 23, 2016),
https://scripps.ucsd.edu/programs/keelingcurve/2016/09/23/note-on-reachingthe-annual-low-point/; Brian Kahn, Earth’s CO2 Passes the 400 PPM Threshold—Maybe Permanently, SCI. AMERICAN (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/earth-s-co2-passes-the-400-ppm-threshold-maybe-permanently/ (explaining that, for the first time, September 2016 carbon dioxide levels remained above 400 parts per million). Four hundred ppm is a symbolic milestone, representing decades of locked-in warming, no matter what happens to reduce carbon emissions in the present or future. Michael Slezak, World’s Carbon
Dioxide Concentration Teetering on the Point of No Return, GUARDIAN (May 11,
2016, 4:11 PM), https://theguardian.com/environment/2016/may/11/worlds-carbon-dioxide-concentration-teetering-on-the-point-of-no-return.
8
Robert T. Watson, Chairman, Int’l Panel on Climate Change, Report to the
Fifth Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (Nov. 2, 1999) (transcript available at https://www.ipcc.ch/
graphics/speeches/robert-watson-november-1999.pdf).
9
Most paleoanthropologists date the emergence of Homo sapiens to roughly
200,000 years ago under the “out-of-Africa” theory. JOHN L. BRADSHAW, HUMAN
EVOLUTION: A NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 185 (2003). Behaviorally
modern humans, however, have a shorter history—roughly 60,000 years. Paul
Mellars, Why Did Modern Human Populations Disperse from Africa ca. 60,000
Years Ago? A New Model, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9381, 9381 (2006).
10
Chaffin Mitchell, It’s So Hot in Arizona that Street Signs and Mailboxes
Are Melting, ACCU WEATHER (June 26, 2017 2:00 PM), https://www.accuweather.com/en/weather-news/its-so-hot-in-arizona-that-street-signs-andmailboxes-are-melting/70002032.
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planes were grounded because it was “too hot to fly.”11 Around the
world, glaciers are retreating at a rate “without precedent,”12 and the
Antarctic ice shelves are disintegrating.13 In coastal zones, “sunny
day flooding” is on the rise,14 and many coastal cities will be inundated within the next twenty years.15 Biodiversity is teetering on the

11
Matt Falcus, Chaos in Arizona: What Happens When It’s Too Hot to Fly?,
MULTIBRIEFS (June 27, 2017), http://exclusive.multibriefs.com/content/chaos-inarizona-what-happens-when-its-too-hot-to-fly/transportation-technology-autmotive; Amy B. Wang, It’s So Hot in Phoenix that Airplanes Can’t Fly, WASH. POST
(June 21, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-weather-gang/
wp/2017/06/20/its-so-hot-in-phoenix-that-airplanes-cant-fly/?utm_term=.
654236489206 (reporting that many regional jets can only operate out of Phoenix
when the temperature is 118º F and below). For a detailed explanation of how
excessive heat affects air travel, see Zach Wichter, Too Hot to Fly? Climate
Change May Take a Toll on Air Travel, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/06/20/business/flying-climate-change.html.
Climate
change could affect a significant percentage of flights by mid-century. See Ethan
D. Coffel et al., The Impacts of Rising Temperatures on Aircraft Takeoff Performance, 144 CLIMATIC CHANGE 381, 384–85 (2017), https://link.springer.com/
content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs10584-017-2018-9.pdf.
12
WORLD GLACIER MONITORING SERV., GLOBAL GLACIER CHANGE
BULLETIN: NO. 1 (2012–2013) 8 (Michael Zemp et al. eds., 2015); accord Margaret Kriz Hobson, Alaska’s Glaciers Are Retreating, SCI. AM. (Sept. 30, 2016),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/alaska-s-glaciers-are-retreating/.
13
See Jugal K. Patel & Justin Gillis, An Iceberg the Size of Delaware Just
Broke Away from Antarctic, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/06/09/climate/antarctica-rift-update.html (last updated July 12, 2017);
Justin Gillis, Antarctic Dispatches: Miles of Ice Collapsing into the Sea, N.Y.
TIMES (May 18, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/05/18/climate/antarctica-ice-melt-climate-change.html. For decades, scientists have been
warning of the catastrophic sea level rise associated with climate-change induced
Antarctic melting. See, e.g., J. H. Mercer, West Antarctic Ice Sheets and CO2
Greenhouse Effect: A Threat of Disaster, 271 NATURE 321, 321 (1978).
14
Justin Gillis, Flooding of Coast, Caused by Global Warming, Has Already
Begun, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/04/science/flooding-of-coast-caused-by-global-warming-has-already-begun.html.
“Sunny day flooding” refers to tidal flooding due to rising sea levels. See Jonathan
Corum, A Sharp Increase in ‘Sunny Day’ Flooding, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/09/04/science/global-warming-increases-nuisance-flooding.html.
15
ERIKA SPANGER-SIEGFRIED ET AL., UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
WHEN RISING SEAS HIT HOME: HARD CHOICES AHEAD FOR HUNDREDS OF US
COASTAL COMMUNITIES 2, 16–19 (2017).
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precipice of mass extinctions.16 Fifteen of the sixteen warmest years
on record have occurred since 2001.17 The last time the world experienced a month with below average temperatures was February
1985.18
Scientists have conclusively documented the anthropogenic origins of climate change.19 Indeed, the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) characterized the scientific evidence as “unequivocal.”20 It seems like the message is finally getting through.
Global CO2 emissions recently stabilized after years of growth,21
and in the 2015 Paris Agreement, the largest carbon emitters, including the United States, China, India, and the European Union, all collectively endorsed the goal of keeping warming as close to 1.5ºC as
possible.22 Advances in sustainable energy make a technologydriven de-carbonization of the world economy increasingly possible.23 A low carbon future is potentially within our grasp.24 Yet, we

16

See Chris D. Thomas et al., Extinction Risk from Climate Change, 427
NATURE 145, 145 (2004) (predicting that under mid-range climate-warming scenarios, 15–37% of species will be committed to extinction by 2050).
17
NASA, NOAA Analyses Reveal Record-Shattering Global Warm Temperatures in 2015, NASA (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.giss.nasa.gov/research/news/20160120/.
18
NASA, GLOBAL Land-Ocean Temperature Index in 0.01 Degrees
Celcius, https://data.giss.nasa.gov/gistemp/tabledata_v3/GLB.Ts+dSST.txt (last
visited Jan. 6, 2018) (1880-present). Anyone under the age of 32 (as of this writing) has never lived through a single month with below average global temperatures.
19
IPCC, supra note 6, at 4–5.
20
Id. at 2.
21
Pilita Clark, Sharp Drop in US Emissions Keeps Global Levels Flat, FIN.
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/540ebb0c-0a60-11e7-ac5a903b21361b43; IEA, RECENT TRENDS IN OECD: ENERGY AND CO2 EMISSIONS 6
(2016), http://www.iea.org/media/statistics/Recent_Trends_in_the_OECD.pdf.
22
Paris Agreement - Status of Ratification, UNITED NATIONS CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/paris_agreement/items/9444.php (last visited Jan. 7,
2018); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of
the Paris Agreement, art. 2, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1, annex (Dec. 12,
2015) [hereinafter Adoption of the Paris Agreement].
23
Johan Rockström et al., A Roadmap for Rapid Decarbonization, 355 SCI.
1269, 1269, 1271 (2017).
24
Id.
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are rapidly approaching a tipping point for major, irreversible climate changes.25 The time for urgent action is now.26
So, naturally, the new President of the United States decided to
withdraw from the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement27 and to vocally
promote the use of coal and other fossil fuels.28 Climate deniers29
and oil executives30 head key federal agencies in the Trump Administration, making it unlikely that there will be climate progress on
25
CHLOE REVILL ET AL., 2020: THE CLIMATE TURNING POINT 7 (2017),
www.mission2020.global/2020%20The%20Climate%20Turning%20Point.pdf.
26
Id. (identifying six critical milestones to reach by 2020, including: zero
emissions transport, renewable electricity generation, large-scale land restoration,
infrastructure decarbonization, and massive investment in climate action).
27
Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. from Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html.https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/
01/climate/trump-paris-climate-agreement.html.
28
See Eric Lipton & Barry Meier, Under Trump, Coal Mining Gets New Life
on U.S. Lands, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/08/06/us/politics/under-trump-coal-mining-gets-new-life-on-us-lands.html;
Alister Doyle, Trump’s Coal Plan Sends U.S. Energy “Back to the Past”,
REUTERS (June 16, 2017, 11:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-climatechange-vatican-idUSKBN197216. During the 2016 campaign, Trump repeatedly touted his willingness to promote coal mining, and in one of his first
speeches after the election, promised to “cancel job-killing restrictions on the production of American energy, including shale energy and clean coal, creating many
millions of high-paying jobs.” Chris Mooney & Steven Mufson, Trump Wants to
Lift Restrictions on ‘Clean Coal.’ Whatever That Is., WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2016)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/11/22/
trump-wants-to-lift-restrictions-on-clean-coal-whatever-that-is/?utm_term=.673
0a8f41da1.
29
Trump’s EPA is run by Scott Pruitt, who is on record stating that carbon
dioxide does not cause global warming. Tom DiChristopher, EPA Chief Scott
Pruitt Says Carbon Dioxide is Not a Primary Contributor to Global Warming,
CNBC: POL., https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/09/epa-chief-scott-pruitt.html (last
updated Mar. 10, 2017, 10:08 AM). Sadly, Pruitt is far from the only member of
the Trump Administration with extreme views on climate change. For a full roster
of the climate views of cabinet members, see Mazin Sidahmed, Climate Change
Denial in the Trump Cabinet: Where Do His Nominees Stand?, GUARDIAN (Dec.
15, 2016, 12:55 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/dec/15/
trump-cabinet-climate-change-deniers.
30
Secretary of State Rex Tillerson was CEO of ExxonMobil until December
2016. In that role, he was accused of misleading shareholders about the costs of
climate change. Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Exxon’s Motion to Quash
and in Support of the Office of the Attorney General’s Cross-Motion to Compel
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the federal level. Despite the United States’ intransigence, the rest
of the world continues moving forward. The G-19 (the G-20 minus
the United States)31 very publicly recommitted itself to the Paris
Agreement.32 Domestically, states, cities, and private actors have
begun stepping forward to advance carbon reduction initiatives,
even without national leadership.33
Unfortunately, our existing legal frameworks make it difficult
for even climate-conscious decision-makers to “see” climate change

at 6–7, People of the State of N.Y. v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 52 N.Y.S.3d
626 (2017) (No. 17-168).
31
Sara Stefanini, G-19 Pledge to Stick to Paris Climate Agreement,
POLITICO, http://www.politico.eu/article/g19-pledge-to-stick-to-paris-climateagreement/ (last updated July 8, 2017, 6:11 AM).
32
G20 Leaders’ Declaration, Shaping an Interconnected World, G20 Germany 2017: Hamburg 10 (July 7–8, 2017), https://www.g20.org/gipfeldokumente/G20-leaders-declaration.pdf (announcing that “[w]e take note of the decision of the United States of America to withdraw from the Paris Agreement . . . .
The leaders of the other G20 members state that the Paris Agreement is irreversible.”).
33
Hiroku Tabuchi & Lisa Friedman, U.S. Cities, States and Businesses
Pledge to Measure Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/11/climate/cities-states-businesses-emissions-climatepact.html. The “We are Still” in declaration has already gathered carbon reduction
commitments from 227 cities and counties, nine states, and thousands of businesses, investors, and educational institutions. “WE ARE STILL IN” DECLARATION,
https://www.wearestillin.com/we-are-still-declaration (last visited Jan. 6, 2018).
My institution, the City University of New York (CUNY), is one of the signatories. Id. America’s Pledge is an umbrella organization led by California Governor,
Jerry Brown, and former New York City Mayor, Michael R. Bloomberg. For more
information, see Letter of Michael R. Bloomberg to United Nations Secretarygeneral António Guterres & Executive Secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change Patricia Espinosa, AMERICA’S PLEDGE,
https://www.americaspledgeonclimate.com/about/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2018). At
the 23rd Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate
Change, held in late 2017, America’s Pledge submitted a report detailing the
scope and scale of ongoing climate action in the United States that is occurring
despite the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. See
generally AMERICA’S PLEDGE, PHASE 1 REPORT: STATES, CITIES, AND
BUSINESSES IN THE UNITED STATES ARE STEPPING UP ON CLIMATE CHANGE
(2017), https://www.bbhub.io/dotorg/sites/28/2017/11/AmericasPledgePhaseOneReportWeb.pdf.
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when approving projects, or making critical infrastructure, agricultural, and land use decisions.34 For example, the National Environmental Policy Act35 requires federal agencies to consider “cumulative impacts,”36 including “indirect” environmental impacts that are
“reasonably foreseeable.”37 Yet, the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission does not consider the climate impacts of exported natural gas when approving new natural gas exporting facilities because a separate agency, the Department of Energy, actually issues
the export approvals for the natural gas.38 The structure of the law,
in this case the division of responsibilities between two interrelated
federal agencies, renders invisible what should be clear—the inherent relationship between a facility designed to increase carbon-intensive fuel exports and the to-be-expected increases in natural gas
production in order to supply that export facility with the natural gas
it will export. This is just one small example39 of how environmental
decision-making remains stuck in old, illogical cubbyholes, and the
fragmented legal frameworks that support them, even as we transgress multiple planetary boundaries.40 This Article suggests how hu-

34

For a description of how variables become simplified and abstracted, and
therefore “legible” to the state, see JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW
CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 25–39
(1998).
35
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.
(2012).
36
40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2011).
37
40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (2011).
38
See EarthReports, Inc., v. FERC, 828 F.3d 949, 952 (D.C. Cir. 2016); see
also Sierra Club v. FERC (Freeport), 827 F.3d 36, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2016); Sierra
Club v. FERC (Sabine Pass), 827 F.3d 59, 62–63 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
39
See, e.g., Alaska Oil & Gas Ass’n v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., No.
4:14-cv-00029-RRB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34848, at *46–*47 (D. Alaska Mar.
17, 2016).
40
The concept of planetary boundaries emerged from interdisciplinary research at the Stockholm Resilience Center. See Johan Rockström et al., Planetary
Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity, 14 ECOLOGY &
SOC’Y 32, 37–38 fig.4 (2009), http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol14/iss2/
art32/ [hereinafter Planetary Boundaries] (identifying nine planetary boundaries:
biodiversity loss, climate change, chemical pollution, stratospheric ozone, atmospheric aerosol loading, ocean acidification, global phosphorus and nitrogen cycles, freshwater use, and land use change). In 2015, this same team of researchers
reported that nearly half of those boundaries had been crossed. Will Steffen et al.,
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man rights norms might help re-frame legal decision-making to better integrate climate change and the entwined destiny of human beings and Planet Earth.
II.

WICKED PROBLEMS, SUPER-WICKED PROBLEMS, AND
CLIMATE CHANGE

At the 1992 Rio Convention, the global community committed
itself to “stabiliz[ing] [] greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”41 Yet, a quarter of a century later,
we are nowhere near achieving that goal. Climate change is a classic
example of what has come to be known as a “wicked” problem.42
The term, coined by design theorist Horst Rittel, distinguishes a certain kind of problem from the “tame” or “benign” problems typically
found in engineering or science.43 “Tame problems” have “relatively well-defined and stable problem statement[s, as well as] a definite stopping point” at which the problem has been answered.44 Solutions can then be tested against an objective standard and accepted
or rejected accordingly. That is not to say that tame problems are
simple; they can be extremely complex and challenging.45 But tame
problems are amenable to the ordinary tools of analysis and verification.46

Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a Changing Planet, 347
SCI. 736, 736 (2015).
41
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. II,
adopted May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 (entered into force Mar. 21, 1994) [hereafter UNFCCC].
42
See generally Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate
Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV
1153, 1159–87 (2009).
43
Horst W. J. Rittel & Melvin M. Webber, Dilemmas in a General Theory of
Planning, 4 POL’Y SCI. 155, 160–61 (1973) (explaining that “wicked’ in this context does not mean “ethically deplorable” but “tricky” or “vicious (like a circle).”).
44
Tom Ritchey, Wicked Problems: Modelling Social Messes with Morphological Analysis, 2 ACTA MORPHOLOGICA GENERALIS 1, 2 (2013).
45
See Joseph C. Bentley, From Wicked to Tame and Vice Versa, CHALLENGE
TAMING WICKED PROBS. (June 2, 2017), http://tamingwickedproblems.com/from-wicked-to-tame-and-vice-versa/.
46
See id.; Ritchey, supra note 44, at 2.
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For wicked problems, by contrast, there is rarely agreement
about how the problem should be stated, let alone how it should be
resolved.47 Instead, wicked problems involve indeterminate problem-definitions, a plurality of perspectives held by multiple stakeholders, and a range of possible solutions, which rely on elusive political judgments about how to best characterize the problem.48 Indeed, it has been said that “every wicked problem can be considered
to be a symptom of another problem.”49
Climate change exhibits all of the attributes of a wicked problem. First, our understanding of how human activities impact the
global climate system is constantly evolving, and new information
is continually forcing revisions to the definition of the problem itself.50 Second, the climate problem is multi-causal: it not only involves the current activities of billions of people across the globe as
they engage in multiple forms of contributory conduct, but also the
historical conduct of a much smaller subsection of that population
stretching back for well over a century.51 Third, climate change involves complex and unpredictable interactions between geophysical, political, social and economic systems, and involves those systems on global, regional, national, and local levels.52 Finally, climate
change has more than one possible solution, with the appropriateness of any given solution hinging largely on the perspective of the
47

See Ritchey, supra note 44, at 2.
See Rittel & Webber, supra note 43, at 160–63.
49
Id. at 165; Wicked Problems: Problems Worth Solving, AUSTIN CENTER
FOR DESIGN, https://www.wickedproblems.com/1_wicked_problems.php (last
visited Jan. 5, 2018).
50
But not that the problem exists. In 1999, the head of the IPCC was already
cautioning “it is not a question of whether the Earth’s climate will change, but
rather when, where and by how much.” Watson, supra note 8.
51
Calculating shares of responsibility is an uncertain process, but there is no
question that the OECD are responsible for the lions share whether measured per
capita or overall. See H. Damon Matthews et al., National Contributions to Observed Global Warming, 9 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 5, 5 tbl.2 (2014), http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/9/1/014010/meta (noting that the
United States alone accounts for roughly 15%, the top seven countries 63%, and
the top twenty countries 82% of observed warming); Michal den Ezen et al., Analyzing Countries’ Contribution to Climate Change: Scientific and Policy-Related
Choices, 8 ENVTL. SCI. & POL. 614, 614, 633 tbl.4, 634–35 (2005).
52
See, e.g., Anthony J. McMichael, Globalization, Climate Change, and Human Health, 368 N. ENG. J. MED. 1336, 1337–38 (2013).
48
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decision-maker. For example, debates over adaptation to climate
change versus mitigation of climate change are expressed through
tussles over whether we should prioritize reducing carbon emissions,53 promoting and protecting carbon sinks,54 managing retreating from vulnerable lands,55 or developing geoengineering technologies.56 These debates reveal more about the preferences and values
of those advocating for each approach than about the inherent superiority of one tactic or another. These debates highlight how the repercussions that flow from adopting any particular solution tend to
create other problems,57 often other wicked problems, forcing a continual re-evaluation of the parameters to be used in decision-making
about climate change.58 In short, wicked problems challenge the

53
See, e.g., Global Warming Solutions: Reduce Emissions, UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/our-work/global-warming/solutions/global-warming-solutions-reduce-emissions (last visited Jan. 7, 2018). New
York City, for example, has committed to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions
by 80% by 2050. New York City’s Roadmap to 80 x 50, NYC SUSTAINABILITY,
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/sustainability/downloads/pdf/publications/New%20
York%20City’s%20Roadmap%20to%2080%20x%2050_20160926_FOR%20W
EB.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2018).
54
See generally Amelia Ravin & Teresa Raine, Best Practices for Including
Carbon Sinks in Greenhouse Gas Inventories, ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www3.epa.gov/ttnchie1/conference/ei16/session3/ravin.pdf (last visited
Jan. 5, 2018); Roger A. Sedjo & Michael Toman, Can Carbon Sinks Be Operational? RFF Workshop Summary 1–2 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper
No. 01-26) http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP01-26.pdf.
55
See Miyuki Hino et al., Managed Retreat as a Response to Natural Hazard
Risk, 7 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 364, 364 (2017).
56
See generally NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES,
CLIMATE INTERVENTION: CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL AND RELIABLE
SEQUESTRATION (2015); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES,
CLIMATE INTERVENTION: REFLECTING SUNLIGHT TO COOL EARTH (2015). But see
Clive Hamilton, Geoengineering is Not a Solution to Climate Change, SCI. AM.
(Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/geoengineering-isnot-a-solution-to-climate-change/.
57
See e.g., Megan Darby, Activists Row Over Bioenergy Role in Meeting
1.5C Climate Target, CLIMATE HOME NEWS (May 20, 2016, 9:40 AM),
http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/05/20/activists-row-over-bioenergyrole-in-meeting-1-5c-climate-target/.
58
Rittel & Webber, supra note 43, at 159.
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core institutions of a society. They are never really solved; “at best
they are re-solved—over and over again.”59
However, as Yale Forestry Professor Ben Cashore pointed out,
climate change is more than a wicked problem; it is what he calls
“super-wicked.”60 Cashore identifies a set of additional confounding
factors that distinguish super-wicked problems from wicked ones.
First, for super-wicked problems, time is running out.61 Second,
those who cause the problem are also those seeking to provide a solution.62 Third, the central authority needed to address a superwicked problem is weak or non-existent.63 And finally, discounting
techniques discourage even inexpensive present-day investments to
avoid long-term impacts, thereby pushing responses far into the future.64 Sadly, climate change meets all these criteria.
A.
Time is Running Out
The window for action to avert a climate catastrophe is closing
rapidly.65 Many consider the Paris Agreement goal of keeping
warming below 1.5ºC to be already out of reach.66 In adopting 1.5ºC
as its goal, the Paris Agreement took a step beyond what had been

59

Id. at 159–60.
Kelly Levin et al., Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems:
Constraining Our Future Selves to Ameliorate Global Climate Change, 45 POL’Y
SCI. 123, 124 (2012) [hereinafter Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems]; K. Levin et al., Playing it Forward: Path Dependency, Progressive Incrementalism, and the “Super Wicked” Problem of Climate Change, 6 IOP CONF.
SERIES 1, 1–2 (2009), http://iopscience.iop.org/article/10.1088/1755-1307/6/50/
502002/pdf.
61
Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems, supra note 60, at 127.
62
Id.
63
Id. at 127–28.
64
Id. at 128–29.
65
Time Window for Action to Limit Climate Change is Closing Rapidly, SCI.
DAILY: SCI. NEWS (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/09/160901125440.htm (reporting on an address by Professor Niklas
Höhne, Special Professor of Mitigation of Greenhouse Gases at Waginenen University).
66
See Joeri Rogelj et al., Paris Agreement Climate Proposals Need a Boost
to Keep Warming Well Below 2ºC, 534 NATURE 631, 631 (2016); Megan Darby,
Scientists: Window for Avoiding 1.5C Global Warming ‘Closed’, CLIMATE HOME
NEWS (June 29, 2016, 6:00 PM), http://www.climatechangenews.com/2016/06/
29/scientists-window-for-avoiding-1-5c-global-warming-closed/.
60
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the most frequently mentioned climate goal—keeping warming below 2ºC.67 Two degrees Celsius had been widely adopted as a climate goal, not because it made sense from a perspective of keeping
climate change within manageable bounds, but because it seemed
achievable. A more honest assessment views this target for “success” as in fact the threshold for catastrophe.68 And yet, we will be
lucky if we can achieve 2ºC.69 The IPCC’s business-as-usual-trajectory projects 2.6ºC to 4.8ºC by 2100,70 which would spell disaster.
B.
Global Political Paralysis
We have decades of data, providing ever-increasing levels of
certainty about the scope and scale of the climate disaster, yet so few
of the necessary choices have been made. The reason for this paralysis stems from Cashore’s second and third super-wicked factors71—the lack of governmental structure and the conundrum that
those who are creating the problem must solve it.
Even the Paris Agreement, the focus of so much political debate,
does little to solve these core problems. The Paris Agreement is, after all, composed entirely of voluntarily-adopted “nationally determined contributions.”72 Each country decided for itself how ambitious it would be.73 As a result, those “nationally determined contributions” have more to do with short-term pragmatic domestic concern than with the actual reductions necessary to avert a climate catastrophe.74 For example, the United States’ nationally determined
67

See Rogelj et al., supra note 66, at 631.
Stefan Rahmstorf & Anders Levermann, Preface to 2020: THE CLIMATE
TURNING POINT, supra note 25, at 3.
69
Richard A. Betts et al., When Could Global Warming Reach 4ºC?, 369
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y A 67, 67–70 (2010) (noting that the center of
the range of projections from the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report hovered
around 4ºC.).
70
Some researchers project even higher temperature rises of 4.78ºC to
7.36ºC. Tobias Friedrich et al., Nonlinear Climate Sensitivity and Its Implications
for Future Greenhouse Warming, SCI. ADVANCES, Nov. 9, 2016, at 1, 3, 9.
71
See Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems, supra note 60, at
127–28.
72
Adoption of the Paris Agreement, supra note 22, at art. 4.
73
Id. at art. 4.
74
Id.; see also Rogelj et al., supra note 66, at 631. See generally Iñigo González-Ricoy & Axel Gosseries, Designing Institutions for Future Generations: An
Introduction, in INSTITUTIONS FOR FUTURE GENERATIONS 3, 4 (Iñigo González68
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contribution was to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 26% to
28% below 2005 levels by 2025.75 The Presidential Climate Action
Project identified as necessary a much more ambitious target—reducing United States’ emissions by 80% by 2050.76 While the
United States’ Paris commitment could have been a first step toward
reaching that more ambitious target, independent analysis of the
United States’ submissions concluded that the country’s likelihood
of reaching that goal under existing law was small.77 And that was
before the 2016 election placed a climate-denier at the helm.
Even if the United States, and the other 146 states that submitted
nationally determined contributions, succeeded in meeting those targets, best estimates are that the resulting emissions would put us on
target for 2.6 to 3.1ºC of warming.78 Moreover, since each country
self-assesses its own success in meeting its nationally-determined
contributions under the Paris Agreement,79 there is no enforcement
mechanism, aside from the requirement of transparency.80 The Paris
Agreement may have been a good start, but it is at most only a beginning. And now, of course, the future of the Paris Agreement is
unclear.
C.
Irrational Discounting
By adopting the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the international community set its sights
Ricoy & Axel Gosseries eds., 2017) (ebook); William D. Nordhaus, The Political
Business Cycle, 42 REV. ECON. STUD. 169, 181–89 (1975).
75
The White House Office of the Press Secretary, FACT SHEET: U.S. Reports Its 2025 Emissions Target to the UNFCCC, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT
BARACK OBAMA (Mar. 31, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2015/03/31/fact-sheet-us-reports-its-2025-emissions-target-unfccc.
76
SUSAN JOY HASSOL, PRESIDENTIAL CLIMATE ACTION PROJECT,
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS: EMISSIONS NEEDED TO STABILIZE CLIMATE 4 (2007),
https://www.climatecommunication.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/presidentialaction.pdf.
77
See Jeffrey B. Greenblatt & Max Wei, Assessment of the Climate Commitments and Additional Mitigation Policies of the United States, 6 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 1090, 1090–91 (2016).
78
Rogelj et al., supra note 66, at 631, 635; Climate Scoreboard: UN Climate
Pledge Analysis, CLIMATE INTERACTIVE, https://www.climateinteractive.org/programs/scoreboard/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2018) (projecting 3.3°C warming by 2100).
79
Adoption of the Paris Agreement, supra note 22, at art. 4, art. 13.
80
Id. at art. 13.
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on preventing “dangerous anthropogenic” climate change.81 In Article 3(3), the UNFCCC directed the Parties to “take precautionary
measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate
change and mitigate its adverse effects.”82 It then tried to bridge the
gap between pure cost-justified regulation and pure precaution by
adding that
[w]here there are threats of serious or irreversible
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be
used as a reason for postponing such measures, taking into account that policies and measures to deal
with climate change should be cost-effective so as to
ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.83
Irrational discounting, Cashore’s fourth super-wicked factor, has
hollowed out this language. 84
Discounting is a core concept in benefit-cost analysis.85 Ever
since President Reagan issued Executive Order 12,291,86 benefitcost analysis has been gaining ascendancy in administrative decision-making and today it is the predominant administrative decision-making tool in the United States.87 In theory, benefit-cost analysis gives decision-makers a consistent metric for making choices.88
81

UNFCCC, supra note 41, at art. II.
Id. at art. III(3).
83
Id.
84
See Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems, supra note 60, at
128–29. For a good explanation of hyperbolic discounting, see Partha Dasgupta,
Discounting Climate Change 18–19 (SANDEE, Working Paper No. 33-08).
85
See William Nordhaus, A Review of the Stern Review and the Economics
of Climate Change, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE 686, 689 (2007).
86
Section 2(b) of this Executive Order provides: “[r]egulatory action shall
not be undertaken unless the potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the potential costs to society.” Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13193,
§ 2(b) (Feb. 19, 1981).
87
The current version of this requirement, in Section 1(b)(6) of Executive
Order 12,866 first issued by President Clinton, shifted the baseline a bit by instructing that “[e]ach agency shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the
intended regulation and, recognizing that some costs and benefits are difficult to
quantify, propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination that
the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs.” Exec. Order No. 12,866,
58 Fed. Reg. 51735, § 1(b)(6) (Oct. 4, 1993).
88
See, e.g., Cost-Benefit Analysis, MINDTOOLS, https://www.mindtools.com/
pages/article/newTED_08.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2018).
82
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By converting all costs and benefits of a proposed action into monetary values, regulators purport to assess the economic efficiency of
the action.89 However, in the context of climate change, the metric
offered by benefit-cost analysis is woefully inadequate. First, attempts to measure the costs of climate change generally only capture
a small portion of the impacts90—those costs that directly impact
economic production, or create non-market impacts that can be expressed in monetary terms. But, this is a vastly incomplete representation of the “costs” flowing from climate change.91
Decision-makers can assign a value to human lives lost (always
a controversial, value-laden task), but what about the disruption to
communities?92 How exactly does one put a value on Tuvalu?93
Moreover, the impacts of climate change are so wide-ranging and so
potentially catastrophic that it borders on the absurd to reduce them
to some number presuming to approximate market value. What cost
should be assigned to the spread of disease associated with climate
change? Lost wages, medical costs, and price-per-capita for mortality capture only the narrowest slice of what that will really cost a
society. Nor can sea-level rise, hurricane intensification,94 ocean

89
Cf. WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A QUESTION OF BALANCE: WEIGHING THE
OPTIONS ON GLOBAL WARMING POLICIES 59 (2008).
90
See Nordhaus, supra note 85, at 692.
91
See id.
92
See generally Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit
Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999).
93
Indeed, the very notion of a price begs another question—should that price
be the amount we would be willing to pay to maintain Tuvalu, or the compensation we would demand for its elimination? (And of course, the notion of which
“we” would make that choice is highly problematic.) The wide discrepancy between the values that people are willing to pay to achieve or prevent an outcome
as opposed to what level of compensation they would demand to accept that same
outcome highlights the core indeterminacy at the heart of this kind of an analysis.
See generally Jack L. Knetsch & J. A. Sinden, Willingness to Pay and Compensation Demanded: Experimental Evidence of an Unexpected Disparity in Measure of Value, 99 Q.J. ECON. 507 (1984) (noting the wide discrepancy between
compensation demanded and willingness to pay); Richard Thaler, Towards a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 39–40 (1980).
Yet, too often the very act of assigning dollar figures obscures this core indeterminacy with a patina of certainty and objectivity.
94
Hurricane Katrina in August 2005, for example, caused over $100 billion
in damage, in addition to loss of over 1,800 lives. Hurricane Katrina Statistics
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acidification, and loss of biodiversity, which are among the most
damaging aspects of climate change, be translated into a conventional marketplace analysis.
These profound caveats and uncertainties have not prevented
economists from attempting to identify the social cost of carbon—a
figure translating the future consequences flowing from climate
change into present monetary values.95 There are three different,
widely-used models for estimating the monetized damages from climate change.96 The models begin to diverge at 1.5ºC change to
global mean temperature, and the gaps between the models increase
dramatically as changes to global mean temperature become more
catastrophic.97 The divergence between these models adds yet another layer of uncertainty.

Fast Facts, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/23/us/hurricane-katrina-statistics-fast-facts/index.html (last updated Aug. 28, 2017, 6:10 PM). Hurricane
Sandy, in 2012, caused about $50 billion in damages, disrupting power to nearly
5 million customers and leaving lasting effects on an extensive area of shoreline
in New York and New Jersey. Mary Williams Walsh & Nelson D. Schwartz, Estimate of Economic Losses Now Up to $50 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/02/business/estimate-of-economic-lossesnow-up-to-50-billion.html; Hurricane Sandy’s Cost May Hit $50 Billion; Rebuilding to Ease Blow, POLITICO (Oct. 30, 2012, 2:06 PM), https://www.politico.com/story/2012/10/hurricane-sandys-cost-may-hit-50-billion-rebuilding-toease-blow-083062. If climate change causes hurricanes to be more frequent, benefit-cost analysis would have to dramatically increase the costs of destruction.
95
The United States government decided that value was $37 per ton of carbon
emitted in 2015. Howard Shelanski, Refining Estimates of the Social Cost of Carbon, WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA: BLOG (Nov. 1, 2013, 4:02 PM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/11/01/refining-estimates-social-cost-carbon. However, depending on the discount rate, the span of possible
values ranged from $12 to $123, an increase from three years earlier when the
estimate range had been between $7 and $81. INTERAGENCY GRP. ON SOC. COST
OF GREENHOUSE GASES, U.S. GOV’T, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT:
TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, at 5 fig.ES-1 (2013).
96
Richard L. Revesz et al., Global Warming: Improve Economic Models of
Climate Change, 508 NATURE 173, 173 (2014), http://www.nature.com/news/
global-warmingimprove-economic-models-of-climate-change-1.14991.
97
Id. at 173–74.
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Second, climate change “stretch[es] social and natural relations
of cause, effect and responsibility” in new ways.98 Most of the benefits of climate regulation accrue in the future, often the distant future, and contributory actions date back to the 18th Century. The
costs, by contrast, are incurred today, and in the near-future. Policymakers conducting a benefit-cost analysis thus rely on discounting
to convert the dollar value of those future benefits into their present
value.99 The implicit value judgments associated with discounting100
add yet another layer of uncertainty to this calculation.101 Simply by
using different discount rates for those future dollars, policy-makers
can reach widely divergent conclusions justifying diametrically opposed regulatory choices. A high discount rate means that those future benefits have little present value,102 and expending resources
98
Harriet Bulkeley, Governing Climate Change: The Politics of Risk Society?, 26 TRANSACTIONS INST. BRITISH GEOGRAPHERS 430, 432 (2001). See also,
Matthew Gandy, Rethinking the Ecological Leviathan: Environmental Regulation
in the Age of Risk, 9 Global Environmental Change 59, 59-60 (1999) (making the
point that conventional risk assessment is ill-suited for new, more systemic risks
like climate change.) For one thing, there is no way to narrow the class of stakeholders for decisions that will affect everyone on the globe and all future generations.
99
This approach is rooted in financial markets. See Nordhaus, supra note 85,
at 689. It rests on the assumption that all human behavior can be appropriately
modeled as selections among preferences that can be reduced to dollar values for
purpose of comparison. See, e.g., Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 88; cf.
NORDHAUS, supra note 89, at 59. While this approach has clear utility under certain circumstances, the absurdity of reducing the “preference” for having a climate
that supports human life should be apparent on its face.
100
See Douglas A. Kysar, Commentary, Politics by Other Meanings: A Comment on “Retaking Rationality Two Years Later”, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 43, 68 (2011)
(pointing out that benefit-cost analyses “inevitably [ ] contain moments deep
within their technical details in which the analyst masks a critical value choice
through a methodological maneuver.”); Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Climate Regulation and the Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1557,
1560–62, 1568, 1596–1599 (2011).
101
Conducting this analysis requires bridging three levels of uncertainty: the
profoundly practical uncertainty about the specific impacts of climate change; the
existential uncertainty about how to value those impacts in dollar terms; and the
value-laden uncertainty about how to compare costs and benefits that accrue at
different times. It is easy to see how the assumptions used to bridge these compounding uncertainties can become outcome determinative.
102
See, e.g., 160 CONG. REC. S3355–56 (daily ed. June 3, 2014) (statement of
Sen. Cornyn) (“[T]he debate . . . is not about the science of climate change; it is a
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today to accrue climate benefits in the future will appear unjustifiable.103 By contrast, employing a lower discount rate leads to a conclusion that “prompt and strong action” to prevent climate change is
“clearly warranted.” 104 The discount rate becomes outcome determinative. The central difference turns on how much to value the future—and future generations.105
Recognizing that climate change is a super-wicked problem with
these four attributes is a first step toward developing responses. The
essence of a super-wicked problem is that it defies ordinary solutions rooted in the ordinary institutions of society.106 Climate change
certainly qualifies. And, as if that were not enough of a challenge,
there is an additional complicating factor: the overwhelming majority of the conduct that has gotten us to this point has been entirely

debate about whether massive regulations should be forced to pass a simple costbenefit analysis.”); 160 CONG. REC. H1654 (daily ed. Feb. 5, 2014) (statement of
Rep. Latta) (“[T]he EPA has put forward broad-reaching regulatory proposals that
are either unachievable or lack sufficient cost-benefit justifications.”).
103
See NORDHAUS, supra note 89, at 10–11, 59–62; Nordhaus, supra note 85,
at 689; see also TED GAYER & W. KIP VISCUSI, DETERMINING THE PROPER SCOPE
OF CLIMATE CHANGE BENEFITS 15–17 (2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/04_determining_proper_scope_climate_change_benefits.pdf (objecting to considering global rather than national benefits in conducting a benefit-cost analysis of the Clean Power Plan, proposed by the Obama Administration to reduce carbon emissions from power plants under the Clean Air
Act).
104
NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE 671 (2007). The Stern Review estimated that the costs and risks associated with not taking action to combat climate change “will be equivalent to losing
at least 5% of global GDP each year, now and forever. If a wider range of risks
and impacts is taken into account, the estimates of damage could rise to 20% of
GDP or more.” Id. at xv. Presenting the Stern Review, then-British Prime Minister
Tony Blair asserted “[w]ithout radical international measures to reduce carbon
emissions within the next 10–15 years, there is compelling evidence to suggest
we might lose the chance to control temperature rises.” Nigel Williams, Costing
Climate Change, 16 CURRENT BIOLOGY R971, R971–72 (2006).
105
Cf. David Weisbach & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Discounting
the Future: A Guide for the Perplexed, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 433, 436 (2009)
(pointing out that “[t]he destruction of Florida through sea level rise in 200
years . . . matters very little in a cost-benefit analysis that relies on discounting.”).
106
See generally Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems, supra
note 60.
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legal.107 Thus, responding to a super-wicked problem like climate
change requires rethinking the social institution of law—specifically
the balance that law strikes between individual and group rights, between current and future interests, and between economic and environmental priorities. That is where human rights come in.
III.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE

If ordinary people are asked to fill in the blank in this sentence:
“Climate change is the greatest ________ challenge that human society faces in the 21st Century,” they might offer a range of different
responses. Maybe the answer would be that climate change is the
greatest technical challenge human society faces. Or, maybe that
climate change poses the greatest social challenge, the greatest political challenge, or the greatest economic challenge. All of those
answers may be true. But, climate change is also the greatest human
rights challenge of the twenty-first century because a safe, clean,
healthy, and sustainable environment is integral to the full enjoyment of human rights,108 and climate change “has clear and immediate implications for the full enjoyment of human rights.”109
Climate change has impacted or will impact a wide range of human rights by undercutting the rights to life, health, food, and water.
For citizens of small island states, climate change will affect the
right to self-determination and the right to culture. The preamble to
the Paris Agreement recognized this relationship:
Acknowledging that climate change is a common
concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking
action to address climate change, respect, promote
and consider their respective obligations on human
rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous
107

For a discussion on this point, see generally Rebecca Bratspies, Claimed
Not Granted: Finding a Human Right to a Healthy Environment, 26 TRANSNAT’L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2017).
108
See generally John Knox (Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the
Environment), Rep. on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/34/49 (Jan. 19, 2017).
109
Male’ Declaration on the Human Dimension of Global Climate Change 2
(Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Male_Declaration_Nov07.pdf.
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peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender
equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity . . . 110
This language, which marked the first time that an international
climate treaty mentioned human rights, was the culmination of a
multi-year advocacy project to “include” human rights in the climate
agreement.111 The Paris Agreement thus took a much heralded step
beyond the Cancun Agreement, which had called on Parties to “fully
respect human rights” in all climate change matters.112 The Paris
Agreement also built on the Human Rights Council’s conclusions
that “climate change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to
people and communities around the world”113 and that climate
change has implications for the full enjoyment of human rights. 114
But, it is not just that climate change poses a threat to human rights.
Because climate change is a super-wicked problem, human rights

110

Adoption of the Paris Agreement, supra note 22, at 21.
See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, A New
Climate Agreement Must Include Human Rights Protections for All: An Open
Letter from Special Procedures Mandate-holders of the Human Rights Council to
the State Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change on the
Occasion of the Meeting of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform
for Enhanced Action in Bonn (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/SP/SP_To_UNFCCC.pdf.
112
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its Sixteenth Session, Held in Cancun from 29 Nov. to 10
Dec. 2010, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1 (Mar. 15, 2011). I have written
elsewhere about the absurdity in thinking that this legal wrangling actually determines the content of human rights. Bratspies, supra note 107, 272–73.
113
Human Rights Council Res. 7/23, at 1 (Mar. 28, 2008).
114
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 I.C.J.
Rep. 7, 89–92, 95–96, 99, 114, 117 (Sept. 25) (separate opinion by Weeramantry,
J.) (asserting that “protection of the environment is . . . a sine qua non for numerous human rights such as the right to health and the right to life itself.”). In its
primer on Human Rights and the Environment, The Center for International Environmental Law helpfully provides a chart connecting various climate impacts
with their human rights correlates. CTR. FOR INT’L ENVTL. LAW, CLIMATE
CHANGE & HUMAN RIGHTS: A PRIMER 6 (2011), http://www.ciel.org/Publications/CC_HRE_23May11.pdf.
111
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can also be part of the solution—offering a theoretical framework to
move law and policy forward in responding to climate change.115
IV.

WHY HUMAN RIGHTS?

In the twenty-first century, human rights are almost reflexively
considered to be jus cogens.116 They “enjoy a prima facie, presumptive inviolability, and will often ‘trump’117 other public goods.”118
Human rights, after all, exist and bind states, regardless of state law
to the contrary. Their entire purpose is to define a core of rights that
are not dependent on favorable state laws.119 Moreover, while human rights flow to individuals120 (and sometimes groups), the state
obligations involved are both horizontal and vertical, meaning that

115

See Human Rights Council Res. 10/4, at 2 (Mar. 25, 2009) (“[H]uman
rights obligations and commitments have the potential to inform and strengthen
international and national policymaking in the area of climate change . . . .”).
116
See Andrea Bianchi, Human Rights and the Magic of Jus Cogens, 19 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 491, 498 (2008) (noting that courts evaluating anti-terrorism Security
Council resolutions have considered human rights to be preemptory norms against
which the Security Council resolutions must be evaluated).
117
No pun intended.
118
LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 4 (1990). The International Court of
Justice has not embraced this view, at least with regard to the principle that the
court’s jurisdiction rests on consent. See Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. Rep. 6, 60, ¶ 3 (separate opinion by ad hoc Dugard, J.).
119
The International Convention on Civil and Political Rights identifies rights
for which states cannot make reservations. See OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS, CORE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWO COVENANTS (2013),
http://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/IHRS/TreatyBodies/Page%20Documents/Core%20Hu
man%20Rights.pdf. Countless scholars have described various human rights as
non-derogable. See, e.g., RACHEL BALL, HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CENTRE,
ABSOLUTE AND NON-DEROGABLE RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1–2 (2011).
Even the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
identifies quite a few human rights norms as having attained peremptory status.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 702 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
120
G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Preamble
(Dec. 10, 1948) (“inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in
the world . . . .”).
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states owe these erga omnes duties not only to persons within their
control, but also to other states.121
As such, human rights offer a means for navigating the netherregions of law—those areas where labels like “legal” and “illegal”
fail to capture the full ramifications of social choices. With regards
to climate change, a human rights framing can be a way to break out
of the path dependencies created by routine regulatory decisions that
“lock in” carbon emissions.122 Indeed, what gives human rights their
power in this context is this ability to cut through business-as-usual
decision-making under existing domestic law. The jus cogens and
erga omnes nature of human rights creates this power—providing
both the lever and the metaphorical “place to stand” that Archimedes
sought in order to move the world.123 It is because of this ability to
infuse ordinary, routine decision-making with new values that human rights have been called “law’s best response to profound, unthinkable, far-reaching moral transgression.”124 This characterization has particular resonance in the climate context because the planetary boundary we humans are most rapidly transgressing is the climate boundary.125
By helping frame responses targeting the super-wicked aspects
of climate change identified above, human rights can provide that
world-moving “place to stand.” First, the urgency of human rights
allows legal systems to respond in a rapid timeframe,126 creating the
capability of responding to the “time is running out” aspect of the
climate crisis. Second, because of the urgency and universality associated with human rights, recognizing climate change as a human
121

See, e.g., Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Ltd. (Belg. v.
Spain), Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep 3, ¶ 33 (Feb. 5).
122
See generally Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems, supra
note 60, at 134–35; Gregory C. Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-In, 28
ENERGY POL’Y 817 (2000).
123
See 1 PLUTARCH, THE LIVES OF THE NOBLE GRECIANS AND ROMANS 418
(Arthur Hugh Clough ed., John Dryden trans. 1992); Gary Berkowitz, trans.,
Tzetzes, Chiliades II, THEOI TEXTS LIBRARY, http://www.theoi.com/Text/
TzetzesChiliades2.html#3 (last visited Jan. 6, 2018).
124
Amy Sinden, Climate Change and Human Rights, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES
& ENVTL. L. 255, 257 (2007).
125
See generally Planetary Boundaries, supra note 40, at 32–33, 38–41.
126
See Responding to Pressing Human Rights Issues, U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS
OFFICE HIGH COMMISSIONER (Sept. 1, 2009), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/Respondingtopressinghrissues.aspx.
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rights problem can reduce the clamor from competing economic and
social interests, allowing policymakers to focus on responding to
climate threats. Moreover, because human rights squarely reject the
notion that national boundaries have salience with respect to questions of justice,127 a human rights framing responds both to the lack
of governing political authority aspect of the climate crisis and to
the discounting problems highlighted above.
Among the key advantages to invoking human rights in the context of climate change is that a human rights framing may make the
problems more tractable (or if you prefer, less wicked). First, articulating the problems of climate change in the language of human
rights allows policymakers to break out of the legal and technical
lock-ins created by past decisions. In other words, human rights can
create the space necessary for legal decision-makers to reinterpret
domestic law to meet climate challenges. Second, to the extent that
human rights are justiciable in international tribunals, new legal arenas allow citizens to assert their rights in a fashion that can reframe
the problem of climate change, and to raise arguments and considerations not possible in the domestic context.128 Human rights can
thus spur action from those at opposite ends of the climate change
conundrum; policy-makers have space to rethink their mission and
an empowered citizenry has a venue to raise new questions. These
two advantages can feed into each other, creating a new relationship
between regulators and the citizenry they serve that in turn makes
possible a rethinking of social order more generally.
A.
Breaking Domestic Boundaries
This first advantage of human rights framing is its potentiallytransformative impact on those charged with making key regulatory
decisions with climate impacts. When decision-makers view themselves as human rights actors, their self-conception of their duties

127
See e.g., Debra Satz, Equality of What Among Whom? Thoughts on Cosmopolitanism, Statism, and Nationalism¸ 41 NOMOS 67, 74 (1999) (espousing this
vision of human rights).
128
See Jeannine Cahill-Jackson, Note, Mossville Environmental Action Now
v. United States: Is a Solution of Environmental Injustice Unfolding?, 6 PACE
INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION 173, 174 (2012).
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and obligations necessarily shifts.129 For example, as noted above,
in approving natural gas and oil pipelines, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) has routinely refused to consider climate change impacts from the natural gas transported by the pipeline, on the rationale that “there is no standard methodology for
quantifying the downstream environmental effects of greenhouse
gas emissions that result from a pipeline project.”130 The FERC
maintained this position even when contracts for the sale of that gas
are already in place131 and emissions can be predicted with great
specificity.
By statute, the FERC is tasked with making decisions in the public’s interest.132 In interpreting this public interest mandate, the
agency has “wide discretion to balance competing equities.”133
Were the FERC to view itself as a human rights decision-maker,
using that discretion would entail acknowledging the inextricably
entwined relationship between energy production, carbon emissions, climate change, and the enjoyment of human rights.
Recognizing these connections would, in turn, mean that during
the pipeline approval process, FERC would take seriously NEPA’s
direction that all federal agencies shall “recognize the worldwide
129
I have elsewhere written about how this might work. See generally Rebecca M. Bratspies, Human Rights and Environmental Regulation, 19 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 225 (2012).
130
Brief for the Respondent at 22, Freeport, 827 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(Nos. 16-1329).
131
Opening Brief for the Petitioner at 36–37, Freeport, 827 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (No. 16-1329); Ellen M. Gilmer, FERC’s Environmental Justice, Climate
Review Scrutinized, E&E NEWS (Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060053253.
132
See e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2005) (“[i]t is declared that the business of
transmitting and selling electric energy for ultimate distribution to the public is
affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation . . . is necessary in the
public interest . . . .”); id. at. § 824b(b) (“[t]he Commission may grant any application for an order under this section . . . upon such terms and conditions as it
finds necessary or appropriate to secure the maintenance of adequate service and
the coordination in the public interest of facilities subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.”); id. at § 824o(d)(2) (“[t]he Commission may approve, by rule or
order, a proposed reliability standard or modification to a reliability standard if it
determines that the standard is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest.”).
133
Columbia Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 750 F.2d 105, 112 (D.C. Cir.
1984).

2018]

THE CLIMATE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

333

and long-range character of environmental problems . . . .”134 Moreover, such an approach would breathe new life into the regulatory
obligation that the FERC consider cumulative impacts135 of any proposed pipeline projects136 by directing agency attention to the cumulative impacts of carbon emissions from pipeline related activities
on the human rights inter alia to life, water, and family. Thus, such
an approach would help the FERC appreciate that its regulatory
mandate is potentially much broader than its current interpretations
allow. Against the backdrop of the relationship between human
rights and climate change, the agency’s consideration of a pipeline’s
impact “when added to [] past, present, and reasonably foreseeable
future actions”137 would necessarily include consideration of the
emissions associated with increased extraction of the natural gas that
the pipeline is designed to transport and the transportation of that
gas, as well as the consumption of that gas with its attendant carbon
emissions.
A human rights-oriented decision-making process would also
create a space to consider the environmental justice issues associated with siting and building pipelines—a social issue within the
purview of the agency. As an independent federal agency, the FERC
is not bound by Executive Order 12,898,138 which directs regulatory
agencies to consider environmental justice and ensure that their environmental activities do not exclude or discriminate against persons
or populations “because of their race, color, or national origin.”139

134

National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1)(F) (2012).
The Council on Environmental Quality has defined cumulative impacts as
“the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the
action [being studied] when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions . . . . Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor
but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.” 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.7 (2012).
136
See, e.g., 1 OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N,
GUIDANCE MANUAL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT PREPARATION 4-3 (2017)
(identifying this inquiry as a “key principle” of the environmental assessment process).
137
40 C.F.R. § 1508.7.
138
City of Tacoma, Wash., 89 F.E.R.C. 61,275, 61,800 n. 8 (1999), 1999
FERC LEXIS 2617 (noting that the executive order applies, by its terms, only to
executive agencies, and excludes independent agencies like the FERC).
139
Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629, § 2–2 (Feb. 11, 1994).
135
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Currently, the FERC has blinded itself to environmental justice concerns associated with pipeline siting.140 For example, the FERC recently defended its refusal to consider disproportionate impacts of a
proposed pipeline, even after acknowledging that nearly 84% of the
proposed pipeline would be located near environmental justice communities.141 To justify this refusal, the FERC relied on census tract
data, even though census tracts are often too large to paint an accurate portrait of which communities live in actual proximity to the
pipeline.142 The dangers of relying on census tract data in this context are well known. Indeed, the EPA’s Environmental Justice Guidance specifically cautions that census tract information needs to be
buttressed with more granular information because “pockets of minority or low-income communities, including those that may be experiencing disproportionately high and adverse effects, may be
missed in a traditional census tract-based analysis.”143
Were the agency to view itself as a human rights decisionmaker, the FERC would view protecting minority and indigenous
populations as integral to its functioning. Such an approach would
reorient and broaden the agency’s consideration of pipeline impacts
on those communities. Rather than directing that the socioeconomic
impacts of a facility be considered “using administrative boundaries
[(i.e. census data)],”144 an approach that unquestionably misses

140

By contrast, the Department of Energy has identified environmental justice
as a priority. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, DOE/LM-1460, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE STRATEGY 5 (2008) (identifying as a goal the “[e]nhanc[ement] [of] procedures to detect and mitigate potential disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental effects of the Department’s programs, policies, and
activities and to promote nondiscrimination among various population segments.”).
141
Brief for Respondent, supra note 130, at 51.
142
Id.; ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS INTO EPA’S NEPA COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS
§ 2.1.1 (Apr. 1998).
143
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 142, at § 2.1.1 (pointing out “the possibility of distortion of population breakdowns” and urging that “[i]n addition to
identifying the proportion of the population of individual census tracts that are
composed of minority individuals, analysts should attempt to identify whether
high concentration ‘pockets’ of minority populations are evidenced in specific
geographic areas.”).
144
OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS, supra note 136, at 4-9.
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many environmental justice concerns,145 the agency would find
ways to obtain a more fine-grained description of the specific community impacted. Such an approach would illuminate rather than
obscure the impacts on minority and indigenous communities. For
example, regarding the controversial Keystone and Dakota Access
Pipelines, the FERC would have viewed itself as bound by the UN
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples146 to ensure prior
informed consent before crossing sacred Sioux ancestral lands.147
And, a regulator acting as a human rights decision-maker would use
the authority to regulate in the public’s interest to take the steps necessary to ameliorate undue burdens on those communities.
Finally, adopting a human rights approach would transform how
the agency approached public participation in its decision-making.
Among the advantages of a human rights approach to participation
in environmental decision-making are increases in transparency,148
proactive efforts to facilitate participation by the poorest and most
marginalized groups, democratized agenda-setting and priority-setting, and the potential that decision-making will create new understandings of community, and identify new possibilities for social
justice.
For example, the right of access to information and the right of
access to courts to remedy violations of human rights have become
well-established as components of the right of participation in international law. Viewing agency obligations through a human rights
lens would incorporate international-law thinking on these topics
into statutes like the Administrative Procedures Act,149 the Freedom

145

See Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai, Introduction to RACE AND THE
INCIDENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS: A TIME FOR DISCOURSE 1, 3–5 (Bunyan Bryant & Paul Mohai eds., 1992).
146
See generally G.A. Res. 61/295, annex, United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 2007).
147
See id. at art. 19.
148
For example, by making information about and proposed actions accessible (including minority languages and formats for persons with disabilities).
149
5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012) (“After notice required by this section, the agency
shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making
through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation.”) (emphasis added).
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of Information Act,150 the National Environmental Policy Act,151
and the Energy Policy Act152 to name only a few. These statutes require that agencies ensure reasonable and adequate opportunities for
public engagement with environmental decision-making. Were the
agencies staffed with administrators who viewed themselves as human rights decision-makers, their sense of what constitutes “reasonable” and “adequate” opportunities to participate would be much
more capacious.
B.
Reframing the Problem
The second advantage of human rights framing is that it offers
an alternative forum—thereby creating a space for examining questions that are obscured by the structures of domestic law.153
As Gerald Torres points out, using international tribunals to
challenge national legal processes can facilitate a normative critique
of how power is exercised domestically.154 The very act of translating a domestic legal decision into international law often reframes
the issues in a fashion that highlights previously hidden aspects of
the problem at issue;155 or, to use the language of anthropology, it
makes the question legible to the State.156 Once these questions have
become legible, new forms of advocacy become possible.157 From
its very inception, the international community recognized this
transformative potential as part of the “progressive[] . . . realization
of [] rights.”158 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights explained:
150

Agencies shall ensure the public has adequate access to government information. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012).
151
Agencies shall ensure that environmental information is made available to
the public before decisions. 42 U.S.C. § 4321(b) (2012).
152
Agency shall afford interested persons a reasonable opportunity to present
their views. 42 U.S.C. § 16421a(b)(4) (2012).
153
See Gerald Torres, Translating Climate Change, 13 N.Z.J. PUB. AND INT’L
L. 137, 146–47 (2015).
154
See id.
155
See id. at 145–47.
156
Cf. SCOTT, supra note 34, at 25–39 (discussing the unification and simplification of local, rural forms of measurement so that such usage would be legible
to the state).
157
See Torres, supra note 153, at 146–47.
158
E.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 2,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
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the fact that realization over time, or in other words
progressively, is foreseen under the Covenant should
not be misinterpreted as depriving the obligation of
all meaningful content . . . . [Progressive realization]
imposes an obligation to move as expeditiously and
effectively as possible towards that goal.159
The plight of Mossville, Louisiana is an example on point. The
citizens of Mossville have spent decades seeking relief from the disproportionate pollution loads their town has been burdened with,
which amounts to racial discrimination.160 The facts are compelling.
Mossville is located in Calcasieu Parish, which is roughly 1,094
square miles and home to approximately 74,000 households.161
Mossville is a tiny dot in the Parish—encompassing just five square
miles and 342 households.162 Yet, tiny Mossville is home to fourteen
industrial facilities that release millions of pounds of toxic chemicals each year.163 Mossville’s residents are predominantly AfricanAmerican, and the town has been in existence since the late 1700s.164

159
International Human Rights Instruments, Compilation of General Comments
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc.
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), at 9 (May 27, 2008).
160
See Second Amended Petition and Petitioner’s Observations on the Government’s Reply Concerning the U.S. Government’s Failure to Protect the Human
Rights of the Residents of Mossville, Louisiana, United States of America, Mossville Environmental Action Now et al., Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R. (Petition No. P242-05), 1–9 (June 23, 2008), http://www.ehumanrights.org/docs/Mossville_
Amended_Petition_and_Observations_on_US_2008.pdf [hereinafter Mossville
Environmental Action Now et al.].
161
Id. at 1; Demographics, CALCASIEU PARISH, http://www.cppj.net/government/demographics (last visited Jan. 7, 2018); Current Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana Population, Demographics and Stats in 2016, 2017, SUBURBAN STATS,
https://suburbanstats.org/population/louisiana/how-many-people-live-in-calcasieu-parish (last visited Jan 7, 2018).
162
Mossville Environmental Action Now et al., supra note 160, at 1.
163
Id. at 2. The Mossville based companies required to report toxic releases
to the EPA include: Air Liquide; Arch Chemical; Biolab; Certainteed; Conoco
Lake Charles Refinery; Entergy Roy S. Nelson Power Plant; Georgia Gulf; Tessenderlo Kerley Chemicals; Lyondell Chemical; Olin; PPG Industries; Sasol;
Tetra Chemicals. Id. at 2–3 n.5–6.
164
Id. at 1.
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By contrast, the Parish overall is about 70% white.165 While the Parish overall has a healthy environment, Mossville does not. The air
and water in Mossville are affected by the disproportionate industrial sitings, and the health consequences for the residents of Mossville have been severe.166
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was intended to correct the scourge
of racial discrimination.167 To that end, Title VI prohibits government funding of racially discriminatory activities. Section 601 of Title VI requires the federal government to ensure that federal funds
are not used to discriminate against people on the basis of race,
color, or national origin.168 Section 602 requires federal agencies to
promulgate regulations designed to implement Section 601.169 The
EPA duly promulgated regulations. Most federal agencies, including the EPA, have adopted such regulations under their Section 602
authority.170
During the nearly thirty-five years since the Civil Rights Act was
passed, it has become clear that racial minorities in the United States
are burdened by a disproportionate share of environmental risks.171
165

Current Calcasieu Parish, Louisiana Population, Demographics and Stats
in 2016, 2017, supra note 161.
166
Id. at 5.
167
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
168
Civil Rights Act § 601 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012))
(providing that “[n]o person shall . . . , on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”).
169
Civil Rights Act § 602 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1
(2012)).
170
Agency-Specific Civil Rights Information, DEP’T. OF JUST., https://
www.justice.gov/crt/agency-specific-civil-rights-information (last visited Jan. 5,
2017).
171
See generally Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Unequal Protection: The
Racial Divide in Environmental Law, A Special Investigation, 15 NAT’L L.J. S2
(1992) (documenting glaring inequities between how agencies enforced environmental laws in communities of color and majority white communities); 1 U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA230-R-92-008A, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY:
REDUCING RISK FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 3 (1992); D. R. Wernette & L. A. Nieves,
Breathing Polluted Air: Minorities Are Disproportionately Exposed, 18 EPA J.
16, 17 (1992); UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, COMM’N FOR RACIAL JUSTICE, TOXIC
WASTE AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES: A NATIONAL REPORT ON THE RACIAL
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Study after study documents the same result. Even studies that control for urbanization and socioeconomics document that the racial
composition of a community is the best predictor for proximity to
polluting facilities like hazardous waste facilities.172 The plight of
Mossville is only one example of how seriously this kind of raciallydisparate treatment can harm a community.173 Unfortunately, Mossville is also an example of a glaring blind spot in United States domestic law—one that leaves the residents of Mossville without a
remedy.174
At first blush, Mossville seems like exactly the kind of discriminatory situation that the Civil Rights Act was intended to remedy.175
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has limited the “majestic
sweep”176 of the Act in a fashion that eviscerates the Act’s promised
protections for environmental justice claimants. First, in both Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Developmental
Corp.177 and Washington v. Davis,178 the Supreme Court limited the
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment solely to acts of intentional discrimination. Then, in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, the Supreme Court ruled that Title VI reaches only conduct
that would violate the Fourteenth Amendment.179

AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF COMMUNITIES WITH HAZARDOUS
WASTE SITES (1987); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-83-168,
SITING OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LANDFILLS AND THEIR CORRELATION WITH
RACIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF SURROUNDING COMMUNITIES (1983).
172

See generally Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 171.
See generally id.
174
See Mossville Environmental Action Now et al., supra note 160, at 15–31.
175
See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
176
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284 (1978).
177
429 U.S. 252, 264–66 (1977).
178
426 U.S. 229, 238–39 (1976).
179
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 438 U.S. at 287; accord Alexander v. Choate,
469 U.S. 287, 293 (1985) (threading together the multiple opinions in Guardian
Association v. Civil Service Commission of N.Y.C. to find a ruling that Title VI
reached only instances of intentional discrimination). See generally Guardian
Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.C, 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
173
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Thus, a plaintiff asserting a civil rights violation under Section
601 must prove intentional discrimination; a showing of discriminatory effect or impact is not enough.180 Unfortunately, that has meant
that the Civil Rights Act cannot help the citizens of Mossville.181
Even though multiple studies have demonstrated that minority communities in general, and Mossville residents in particular, are exposed to significantly more environmental pollution than are their
white counterparts, it is next to impossible to prove that the siting of
any particular facility was driven by the intent to discriminate.182
Absent explicit evidence of a racially-discriminatory motive, even
siting decisions that are “insensitive and illogical,” will fail to satisfy
this extremely stringent standard.183 As a result, United States courts
faced with environmental justice claims have repeatedly found that
“the Equal Protection Clause does not impose an affirmative duty to
equalize the impact of official decisions on different racial
groups.”184
Regulations promulgated under Section 602 have been rendered
similarly toothless. In Guardians Association v. Civil Service Commission of N.Y.C.,185 the Supreme Court held that while Section 601
requires proof of discriminatory intent, agencies may validly adopt
regulations implementing Title VI that also prohibit discriminatory
effects. However, in Alexander v. Sandoval,186 the Supreme Court
blunted the impact of Section 602 by concluding that there was no
private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under that
Section.187 Thus, communities like Mossville have no remedy under
United States law.188

180
Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp., 482 F. Supp. 673, 677, 679–80 (S.D. Tex.
1979), aff’d mem., 782 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1986).
181
See Mossville Environmental Action Now et al., supra note 160, at 26.
182
See id. at 8, 26; see, e.g., Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 677, 679–80. See generally
Lavelle & Coyle, supra note 171.
183
Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 681.
184
R.I.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1150 (E.D. Va. 1991).
185
463 U.S. 582, 587 (1983).
186
532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001).
187
Id. (holding that “[n]either as originally enacted nor as later amended does
Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right of action to enforce
regulations promulgated under § 602. We therefore hold that no such right of action exists.”).
188
Mossville Environmental Action Now et al., supra note 160, at 15–31.
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Reframing their complaint in the language of human rights offered Mossville residents a path forward.189 Where United States domestic law could not see Mossville’s complaint, human rights law
is more encompassing because it recognizes the interwoven nature
of human rights and the environment.190 Indeed, it has become a
well-accepted principle of international law that that full enjoyment
of human rights depends on protection against environmental
harms.191 To that end, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination included environmental racism as a state policy and
practice that violates fundamental human rights.192 And, by encompassing state actions that have the effect of preventing equal enjoyment of fundamental human rights, this vision of equality goes well
beyond the narrow United States Supreme Court equal protection
jurisprudence.
By bringing a claim before the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, the Mossville plaintiffs were finally able to argue
that there was a problem with the very structure of United States
law.193 It was only by leaving the jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court that Mossville’s residents could argue that the
Court’s Title VI jurisprudence created an untenable legal standard.194 In Mossville Environmental Action Now v. United States,
Mossville’s citizens could finally assert that the domestic law interpretation of equality that denied them the opportunity to raise their
claims in the United States was itself a human rights violation—depriving them of equality before the law.195 The Mossville plaintiffs
also had the opportunity to raise their substantive claims about the

189

See Cahill-Jackson, supra note 128, at 174.
See John H. Knox (Independent Expert on Human Rights and the Environment), Mapping Rep. on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations Relating to the
Enjoyment of a Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/25/53, ¶ 53 (Dec. 30, 2013).
191
See Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on Its
Sixty-First Session, at 107–08, U.N. Doc. A/57/18 (2002).
192
Id. (identifying “the rights to freedom, equality and adequate access to
basic needs such as clean water, food, shelter, energy, health and social care” as
rights potentially violated by environmental racism).
193
See Cahill-Jackson, supra note 128, at 183, 187.
194
See Mossville Environmental Action Now et al., supra note 160, at 26.
195
Id. at 15–18.
190
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harm to health and welfare from the operations of the fourteen facilities located in their community.196 By agreeing to hear the case, the
Inter-American Commission created the possibility of a new consideration within the United States of how its domestic law falls short
of international human rights standards.197
This kind of space for legal argument will be invaluable in the
climate context. The Inuit Petition is a good example of the legal
changes that can come from access to an international tribunal to
raise a human rights claim.198 The Inuit Petition marked a definitive
moment in the legal conversation about the relationship between human rights and climate change.199 The Petition alleged that the
United States’ carbon emissions (and lack of a climate change policy) violated Inuit rights to culture, property, health, life, food, and
family.200
By any conventional legal standard, the Inuit surely “lost”—
their petition was dismissed as nonjusticiable, with the Commission

196

Id. at 2.
Mossville Environmental Action Now v. United States, Inter-Am.
Comm’n on H.R., Report No. 43/10 ¶¶ 42–43 (2010) (finding that Mossville
Plaintiffs have a cause of action under the American Declaration on the Rights of
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concluding that “the information provided does not enable us to determine whether the alleged facts would tend to characterize a violation of rights protected by the American Declaration.”201 Yet in
terms of taming the super-wicked problem of climate change, the
Inuit Petition was a critical first step. It not only forced the question
of climate change onto the Commission’s agenda, but also prompted
the Commission toward action.202 The Inuit Petition was dismissed
in November 2006;203 however, by March 2007, the Commission
had convened a hearing to explore the links between human rights
and climate change.204 The Inuit Petitioners were invited to provide
testimony at that hearing.205 During the 2015 run up to the Paris
Agreement, the Commission “recognized that the realization of the
right to life, and to physical security and integrity is necessarily related to and in some ways dependent upon one’s physical environment.”206 By providing both the lever and the proverbial place to
stand, the Inuit Petition used access to the international legal tribunal
to move the world.207 As such, the Petition underscores the vital connection between political mobilization and human-rights centered
strategies.
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CONCLUSION

Climate change is truly a super-wicked problem that challenges
human society on all fronts—it stretches legal and political institutions beyond their current boundaries even as it simultaneously
erodes the bio-geophysical underpinnings upon which those institutions rest. If we are to succeed in keeping the effects of anthropogenic greenhouse gases within parameters amenable to human existence, we will need new ways to conceptualize our human-created
legal and social institutions. Invoking human rights can help. Thinking about climate change in human rights terms offers a relatively
new, cross-cutting way to restructure critical institutions—one
which transcends national boundaries, empowers ordinary citizens,
and reorients bureaucratic decision-making.
This kind of an approach views law and rights as elements of
struggle that must “be politicized before they are legalized.” 208 Human rights does this by reframing environmental disputes and redirecting attention away from experts, from technical specifications,
and from legal categories. Instead, human rights focuses attention
on ordinary people and on questions of equality and fundamental
justice. As such, human rights can move marginalized groups and
issues to the center. It is this potential for reframing that gives the
narrative of human rights so much power. Human rights are one of
the few legal theories capable of taming some of the super-wicked
institutional challenges posed by climate change, and thus creating
a “place to stand” from which to confront climate change’s bio-geophysical challenges.
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